Poverty, Inequality and the Challenges of Pro-Poor Governance in Bangladesh

Weak governance as a result of clientelist practice is often considered as the single-most important factor behind the growing inequality and persistent poverty in Bangladesh. Using a rights-based approach (RBA), this article examines regional disparity, central–local relations and the scope for peo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of South Asian development 2010-10, Vol.5 (2), p.187-219
Main Author: Afsar, Rita
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bangladesh
Clientelism
Collective action
Governance
Inequality
Institutions
Local communities
Poverty
Social capital
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Summary:Weak governance as a result of clientelist practice is often considered as the single-most important factor behind the growing inequality and persistent poverty in Bangladesh. Using a rights-based approach (RBA), this article examines regional disparity, central–local relations and the scope for peoples’ participation under the existing rules and practices. It also sheds light on the cultural aspects of governance constituted of trust, social solidarity and institutional connectivity using an empirical data set generated from a census of six villages in Bangladesh backed by a triangulation of the qualitative and quantitative research tools. It has demonstrated that the rising inter- and intra-regional inequality is an outcome of inequitable distribution of public goods and services confirming the clientelist syndrome of the government. Further, excessive control by the national government impedes innovation and efficient delivery of services by the local bodies, which ultimately hampers pro-poor growth. One of the most important findings of this study is the emergence of the school as the most trusted institution in the village. On the basis of the study, it can also be argued that social capital does not always lead to a positive-sum outcome, rather it can be turned to a zero-sum game depending on the socio-cultural contexts and other factors such as the overall level of literacy of the villagers, strong networks both within and outside the village among other factors.
ISSN:0973-1741
0973-1733
DOI:10.1177/097317411000500201