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The certification hypothesis of fairness opinions for acquiring firms
► We study the certification role of fairness opinions in corporate transactions. ► Our model, a simple non-cooperative setting, allows for asymmetric information and possibly misaligned managerial incentives. ► We analyze the effect of different regulatory scenarios on shareholder value and discuss...
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Published in: | International review of law and economics 2011-12, Vol.31 (4), p.240-248 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | ► We study the certification role of fairness opinions in corporate transactions. ► Our model, a simple non-cooperative setting, allows for asymmetric information and possibly misaligned managerial incentives. ► We analyze the effect of different regulatory scenarios on shareholder value and discuss implications for optimal regulation.
We study the certification role of fairness opinions in corporate transactions in a simple non-cooperative setting with asymmetric information and possibly misaligned managerial incentives, and discuss the effect of different regulatory scenarios. Specifically, we compare three settings: one in which no third-party fairness opinion is available, one in which the management is required to obtain a fairness opinion before any transaction, and one in which the management’s decision to require a fairness opinion is voluntary. We compare shareholder value in each of the three scenarios and discuss implications for the optimal design of regulatory environments for fairness opinions. |
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ISSN: | 0144-8188 1873-6394 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.irle.2011.07.004 |