Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967
The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However...
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Published in: | Intelligence and national security 2011-04, Vol.26 (2-3), p.291-312 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | eng |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it - even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence - thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief. |
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ISSN: | 0268-4527 1743-9019 |