Strategic and Protest Voting for Third Parties: The Case of the Canadian NDP

Duverger's Law argues that "third" parties should disappear under the "first- past-the-post" system. The presence of persistent third parties, therefore, provides an anomaly to be explained. In this paper we argue that this "winner-take-all" electoral system can pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Political research quarterly 1992-06, Vol.45 (2), p.485-499
Main Authors:	Bowler, Shaun, Lanoue, David J.
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Canada Constituents Elections Electoral districts Indexing in process Labor protests Net domestic product Plurality voting Political candidates Political parties Political protests Third parties Voter behavior Voting Voting behaviour
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	Duverger's Law argues that "third" parties should disappear under the "first- past-the-post" system. The presence of persistent third parties, therefore, provides an anomaly to be explained. In this paper we argue that this "winner-take-all" electoral system can provide circumstances which can sustain minor parties. Taking as our case study the Canadian New Democratic party, we show that both "strategic" and "protest" voting can work to the benefit of minor parties. Both types of voting force us to modify our conceptions of both Duverger's Law and "rejection" voting.
ISSN:	0043-4078 1065-9129 2325-8675 1938-274X