Theoretical Indeterminacy, Pluralism and the Conceptual Concrete

Theoretical Indeterminacy, Pluralism and the Conceptual Concrete

Metaphysical pluralism is examined as a proposed explanation for theoretical indeterminacy in psychology and found wanting. A more promising view is that indeterminacy is caused by a methodological inadequacy that can be overcome by a revised understanding of abstraction in theory construction. The...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theory & psychology 1991-05, Vol.1 (2), p.147-162
Main Author: Tolman, Charles W.
Format: Article
Language:eng
Subjects:
Methodological Problems
Methodology (Philosophical)
Pluralism
Psychology
Theoretical Problems
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Metaphysical pluralism is examined as a proposed explanation for theoretical indeterminacy in psychology and found wanting. A more promising view is that indeterminacy is caused by a methodological inadequacy that can be overcome by a revised understanding of abstraction in theory construction. The revision involves a genetic or historical approach to concept formation that reveals the concrete interrelations among qualities so that they can be ordered with respect to deductive priority.
ISSN:0959-3543
1461-7447