A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats

International bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy. How does this affect bureaucrats' incentives to truthfully reveal their private information? I construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies trans...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	International organization 2007-04, Vol.61 (2), p.245-275
Main Author:	Johns, Leslie
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Bargaining Bias Bureaucracy Bureaucrats Cheap talk Civil servants Communication Decision making Drafts Economic models Expected utility Incentives Information Information Dissemination Inspections International agreements International cooperation International organizations International political organizations International relations Iraq Mathematical intervals Multilateralism Policy Making Political communication Political science Politics Principals Public Sphere Unilateralism United Nations Weapons
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Summary:	International bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy. How does this affect bureaucrats' incentives to truthfully reveal their private information? I construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies translate into outcomes. The bureaucrat can communicate publicly observable messages about this information to two policymakers, who must then bargain over a set of policy choices. I find that both the bureaucrat's willingness to communicate informatively and the choice of an optimal bureaucrat are highly contingent on the bargaining powers of the two policymakers. When each policymaker is bound to adhere to the bargaining outcome, “moderate” bureaucrats are most preferred. In contrast, when at least one policymaker can leave the bargaining table and exercise an outside option, “biased” bureaucrats can be optimal. I illustrate my findings by examining UN weapons inspections in Iraq from 1991 to 2003.I wish to thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Michael Gilligan, Catherine Hafer, Matias Iaryczower, Dimitri Landa, Adam Meirowitz, Alastair Smith, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback. Previous drafts of this article were presented in the New York University Politics Department Research Workshop and the 2006 Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association.
ISSN:	0020-8183 1531-5088