On offense history and the theory of deterrence

This article uses a two-period version of the standard economic model of deterrence to study whether sanctions should depend on an individual’s record of prior convictions—his offense history. The principal contribution of the article is to demonstrate that it may be optimal to treat repeat offender...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International review of law and economics 1998-09, Vol.18 (3), p.305-324
Main Authors: Polinsky, A.Mitchell, Shavell, Steven
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Crime
Criminal justice
Criminal sentencing
Criminals
Delinquency
Deterrence
Habitual offenders
Offenders
Sanctions
Social problems
Studies
Theory
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Summary:This article uses a two-period version of the standard economic model of deterrence to study whether sanctions should depend on an individual’s record of prior convictions—his offense history. The principal contribution of the article is to demonstrate that it may be optimal to treat repeat offenders disadvantageously because such a policy serves to enhance deterrence: When an individual contemplates committing an offense in the first period, he will realize that if he is caught, not only will he bear an immediate sanction, but also—because he will have a record—any sanction that he bears in the second period will be higher than it would be otherwise.
ISSN:0144-8188
1873-6394
DOI:10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00009-X