Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence

The “Law of 1/ n” posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending. Despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact, the Law of 1/ n has received only limited empirical scrutiny, and the existing evidence for the American States provides mixed suppo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of public economics 2001-12, Vol.82 (3), p.309-325
Main Authors:	Bradbury, John Charles, Crain, W.Mark
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Bicameralism Cross-national analysis Economics Fiscal policy Government spending Law of 1/n Legislative power Legislative process Logrolling National legislatures Political economy Public economics Public expenditure
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	The “Law of 1/ n” posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending. Despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact, the Law of 1/ n has received only limited empirical scrutiny, and the existing evidence for the American States provides mixed support for the thesis. This paper examines the Law of 1/ n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross-section of democratic countries. The results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures, but bicameralism dampens the 1/ n effect relative to unicameralism.
ISSN:	0047-2727 1879-2316