Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions
This paper studies the institutional characteristics of sequential cattle auctions and their effects on prices. It examines the effects of the order of sale according to quality, secret reserve prices, bidders' multi-unit demands and certain characteristics of the bidders. Theory predicts decli...
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Published in: | International journal of industrial organization 2009, Vol.27 (1), p.33-42 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | eng |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper studies the institutional characteristics of sequential cattle auctions and their effects on prices. It examines the effects of the order of sale according to quality, secret reserve prices, bidders' multi-unit demands and certain characteristics of the bidders. Theory predicts declining prices when sellers are allowed to reject the outcome of the auction, and increasing prices when bidders demand more than one unit. I find evidence that observed declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve prices. I also find that bidders consider the strategic effect of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand. |
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ISSN: | 0167-7187 1873-7986 |