Language and motor cortex response to comprehending accidental and intentional action sentences

Understanding the meaning of others' actions involves mentally simulating those actions by oneself. Embodied theories of language espouse a prominent role for motor simulation in reading comprehension, especially when words, sentences, or narratives portray everyday actions. Inherent in these a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Neuropsychologia 2015-10, Vol.77, p.158-164
Main Authors: Kana, Rajesh K., Ammons, Carla J., Doss, Constance F., Waite, Megan E., Kana, Bhumika, Herringshaw, Abbey J., Ver Hoef, Lawrence
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accidental action
Adolescent
Adult
Brain Mapping
Cerebral Cortex - physiology
Comprehension - physiology
Embodied cognition
Female
fMRI
Humans
Intentional action
Intentionality bias
Language Tests
Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Male
Neuropsychological Tests
Pattern Recognition, Visual - physiology
Photic Stimulation
Reading
Sentence comprehension
Young Adult
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Understanding the meaning of others' actions involves mentally simulating those actions by oneself. Embodied theories of language espouse a prominent role for motor simulation in reading comprehension, especially when words, sentences, or narratives portray everyday actions. Inherent in these actions is the level of agency of the actor. Motor cortex activity in response to processing action verbs has been relatively well-established. What has been less explored, however, are: (1) the neural bases of determining whether an action is intentional or accidental (agency); and (2) whether agency influences level of motor simulation. This functional MRI study investigated how language and motor areas of the brain respond to sentences depicting intentional versus accidental action. 25 healthy adults read a series of sentences in the MRI scanner and determined whether the actions described were accidental or intentional. The main results include: (1) left hemisphere language areas (left inferior frontal gyrus, LIFG; left superior temporal gyrus, LSTG), premotor cortex (PM), and presupplementary motor area (pSMA) were strongly activated by both sentence types; (2) processing accidental action, relative to intentional action, elicited greater activity in LIFG, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and left amygdala; no statistically significant activity was found in the opposite contrast; and (3) greater percent signal change was observed in LIFG while processing accidental action and in right precentral gyrus for intentional action. The results of this study support language and motor region involvement in action sentence comprehension in accordance with embodiment theories. Additionally, it provides new insight into the linguistic, integrative, and emotional demands of comprehending accidental action, its underlying neural circuitry, and its relationship to intentionality bias: the predisposition to ascribe purpose to action. •Brain activity measured while reading accidental and intentional action sentences.•Language and motor cortex activity found for both types of action sentences.•Accidental sentences had more activity in LIFG, MPFC, and left amygdala.•No significantly greater activity for intentional sentences compared to accidental.•Accidental action processing requires overriding of intentionality bias.
ISSN:0028-3932
1873-3514
DOI:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.08.020