Wittgenstein on the language of rituals: the scapegoat remark reconsidered

Wittgenstein's remarks on religion suggest a provocative and nuanced account of what makes rituals meaningful – and why some living rituals might have little or no meaning despite their hold on congregants. Wittgenstein's view has been obscured, I argue, in part by the consistent misinterp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Religious studies 2012-06, Vol.48 (2), p.165-182
Main Author: HOYT, CHRISTOPHER
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Animal behavior
Atheism
Christianity
Funerary rituals
General philosophy. Metaphysics
Gestures
History and sciences of religions
Jewish rituals
Judaism
Metaphysics
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Philosophy of religion
Ratzinger, Joseph
Religion
Religious congregations
Religious rituals
Religious studies
Rites & ceremonies
Rituals
Scapegoats
Sin
Studies in religion
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
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Summary:Wittgenstein's remarks on religion suggest a provocative and nuanced account of what makes rituals meaningful – and why some living rituals might have little or no meaning despite their hold on congregants. Wittgenstein's view has been obscured, I argue, in part by the consistent misinterpretation of his controversial ‘scapegoat remark’, which has been taken to be a comment on the internal incoherence of the ancient Jewish scapegoat rite. In fact, Wittgenstein's point is that the scapegoat ritual is particularly easy to misinterpret, and so reflection on it helps illustrate the sort of confusion that plagues much thinking about religion and ritual.
ISSN:0034-4125
1469-901X
DOI:10.1017/S0034412511000163