Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2012-02, Vol.102 (1), p.396-427
Main Authors: Moser, Petra, Voena, Alessandra
Format: Article
Language:eng
Subjects:
Chemicals
Compulsory licensing
Custodians
Developing countries
Dyes
Economic models
Economic theory
Enterprises
Federations
Grants
History of technology
Immigration
Intellectual property
International trade
Inventions
Inventors
LDCs
Licences
Licenses
Licensing
Lifesaving
Organic chemicals
Patent licensing
R&D
Research & development
Research and development
Studies
Tariffs
Trade restrictions
Trading with the Enemy Act
World War I
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Description
Summary:Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-indifferences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981