Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist

There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question again...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of the history of philosophy 2024-07, Vol.62 (3), p.421-447
Main Author: Goldhaber, Charles
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Deduction
Empiricism
Hume, David (1711-1776)
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)
Knowledge
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Principles
Reading
Skepticism
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Summary:There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant’s Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant’s view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism.
ISSN:0022-5053
1538-4586
1538-4586
DOI:10.1353/hph.2024.a932355