MISLED BY EXAMPLE: WHY AUER DEFERENCE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO REGULATORY EXAMPLES

Collins discusses why auer deference should be applied to regulatory example. He advances the discussion of regulatory examples by pushing back against Morse and Osofsky's thesis that regulatory examples should receive coequal weight with the substantive rule portions of regulations. He also ar...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Virginia tax review 2023-01, Vol.42 (2), p.315-352
Main Author:	Collins, James
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Administrative law Basis (Taxation) Delegation of authority Evaluation Government agencies Heuristic Judicial review of administrative acts Laws, regulations and rules Public administration Tax courts Tax regulations Tax shelters Transfer pricing
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	Collins discusses why auer deference should be applied to regulatory example. He advances the discussion of regulatory examples by pushing back against Morse and Osofsky's thesis that regulatory examples should receive coequal weight with the substantive rule portions of regulations. He also argues that examples serve to merely clarify substantive regulations, and, therefore, should receive deference only if the substantive regulations themselves are unclear. Like Morse and Osofsky's approach, he limits its focus to only regulatory examples -- that is, those examples that appear in the substantive text of final agency regulations as opposed to examples that appear in regulatory preambles or other forms of guidance. Further, he will refer to the rule statements in final regulations as substantive regulations.
ISSN:	0735-9004