First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/e2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Journal of the ACM 2023-10, Vol.70 (5), p.1-86, Article 36
Main Authors:	Jin, Yaonan, Lu, Pinyan
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Algorithmic game theory Algorithmic mechanism design Computational pricing and auctions Exact and approximate computation of equilibria Quality of equilibria Representations of games and their complexity Theory of computation
Citations:	Items that this one cites
Online Access:	Get full text
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