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Kant on Despondent Moral Failure
Typically, Kant describes maxims that violate the moral law as engaging in a kind of comparative judgement: the person who makes a false promise judges it best – at least subjectively – to deceive her friend. I argue that this is not the only possible account of moral failure for Kant. In particular...
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Published in: | Kantian review 2023-03, Vol.28 (1), p.125-141 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Typically, Kant describes maxims that violate the moral law as engaging in a kind of comparative judgement: the person who makes a false promise judges it best – at least subjectively – to deceive her friend. I argue that this is not the only possible account of moral failure for Kant. In particular, when we examine maxims of so-called despondency (Verzagtheit) we find that some maxims are resistant to comparative judgement. I argue that this is true for at least two reasons: first, the despondent agent has a maxim to avoid suffering at all costs; second, this anxious preoccupation with suffering makes the despondent agent prone to failures associated with the imagination and its role in creating an ideal of happiness. |
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ISSN: | 1369-4154 2044-2394 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S1369415422000498 |