Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Based on Carbon Tax and Government Subsidy Policy

To meet the demands of society’s transition to a low-carbon economy, this study analyzes and designs a coordination contract that is suitable for a low-carbon supply chain, under the circumstances of a carbon tax policy and government subsidies; this is to achieve a reduction in emissions and a grow...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Sustainability 2023-01, Vol.15 (2), p.1135
Main Authors: Ran, Wenxue, Xu, Teng
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Carbon content
Climate change
Competitiveness
Coordination
Decision making
Emission analysis
Emissions
Numerical analysis
Profits
Revenue
Supply chains
Tax rates
Taxation
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Summary:To meet the demands of society’s transition to a low-carbon economy, this study analyzes and designs a coordination contract that is suitable for a low-carbon supply chain, under the circumstances of a carbon tax policy and government subsidies; this is to achieve a reduction in emissions and a growth in the total profits of the supply chain, while simultaneously improving the sustainable competitiveness and coordination of the supply chain. Manufacturers and retailers make up the two levels of the supply chain that are the focus of this study. Both centralized and decentralized decision-making models are created using the Stackelberg game method. By analyzing the supply chain decision-making and emission-reduction strategies in both cases, the revenue-sharing contract is designed to achieve the sustainable coordination of the y chain. The results of the numerical analysis show the following: first, that more orders are placed and emissions are reduced under centralized decision-making than under decentralized decision-making; second, that the total supply chain’s profits are higher when all parties comply with the revenue-sharing contract than when there are no contracts; third, that the revenue-sharing contract allows for the free allocation of supply chain gross margins in the enterprise for supply chain coordination.
ISSN:2071-1050
2071-1050
DOI:10.3390/su15021135