Equilibrium in a civilized jungle

The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best-suited in t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theoretical economics 2022-07, Vol.17 (3), p.943-953
Main Authors: Rubinstein, Ariel, Yildiz, Kemal
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agents
Assignment
civilized equilibrium
Dictators
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Jungle equilibrium
justifiability
Language
Rhetoric
Welfare
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Summary:The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best-suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium; (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium; and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem.
ISSN:1555-7561
1933-6837
1555-7561
DOI:10.3982/TE4886