The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate

Recent work on US policymaking argues that responsiveness to public opinion is distorted by money, in that the preferences of the rich matter much more than those of lower-income Americans. A second distortion—partisan biases in responsiveness—has been less well studied and is often ignored or downp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American political science review 2019-11, Vol.113 (4), p.917-940
Main Authors: LAX, JEFFREY R., PHILLIPS, JUSTIN H., ZELIZER, ADAM
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Affluence
Bias
Constituents
Distortion
Estimates
Evidence
Federal legislation
Health care policy
Inequality
Influence
Legislators
Legislatures
Low income groups
Money
Partisanship
Policy making
Political parties
Political science
Preferences
Primaries & caucuses
Public opinion
Representation
Responsiveness
Standard deviation
Tax cuts
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Summary:Recent work on US policymaking argues that responsiveness to public opinion is distorted by money, in that the preferences of the rich matter much more than those of lower-income Americans. A second distortion—partisan biases in responsiveness—has been less well studied and is often ignored or downplayed in the literature on affluent influence. We are the first to evaluate, in tandem, these two potential distortions in representation. We do so using 49 Senate roll-call votes from 2001 to 2015. We find that affluent influence is overstated and itself contingent on partisanship—party trumps the purse when senators have to take sides. The poor get what they want more often from Democrats. The rich get what they want more often from Republicans, but only if Republican constituents side with the rich. Thus, partisanship induces, shapes, and constrains affluent influence.
ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S0003055419000315