Loading…

Supersize me? Franchisee size and voluntary compliance with corporate brand‐building initiatives

We examine the effects of a franchisee's size, distance from headquarters, and local competition on voluntary compliance with corporate brand‐building initiatives at the outlet level. Specifically, we consider compliance with a corporate social responsibility effort to solicit charitable donati...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of operations management 2019-10, Vol.65 (7), p.659-684
Main Authors: Massimino, Brett, Lawrence, Benjamin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We examine the effects of a franchisee's size, distance from headquarters, and local competition on voluntary compliance with corporate brand‐building initiatives at the outlet level. Specifically, we consider compliance with a corporate social responsibility effort to solicit charitable donations at the time of retail checkout, measuring compliance performance as the amount of donations received at each outlet. Our analysis utilizes an objective, longitudinal sample of 777 franchised outlets in a national quick‐service restaurant chain. Surprisingly, we find that distance from headquarters is positively related to compliance; we relate this finding to recent, extant research on geographic distances and franchisee behaviors. We find the beneficial effects of larger, multiunit franchisees are mitigated as franchisees' geographic distances from headquarters increase; we relate these findings to horizontal agency within franchising systems. We further find that franchised outlets in more competitive markets comply less with brand‐building initiatives, even less so when part of a larger franchisee network. Our results underscore the important moderating role franchisee size plays in outlets' compliance, which we link back to extant perspectives on agency theory. Supplemental analyses consider tensions between compliance and operational efficiency, as well as effects of hypothesized factors on another mandatory form of compliance.
ISSN:0272-6963
1873-1317
DOI:10.1002/joom.1056