EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE QUINE-CARNAP DEBATE

:  Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine‐Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic‐synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Pacific philosophical quarterly 2006-12, Vol.87 (4), p.499-508
Main Author: LOOMIS, ERIC J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Philosophy
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Summary::  Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine‐Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic‐synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non‐question‐begging way.
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00273.x