Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

J. Bergin and B. Lipman ( Econometrica 64 (1996), 943–956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29–56) and P. Young ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 57–84) is due to restrictions on how t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic theory 2002-10, Vol.106 (2), p.296-315
Main Authors: van Damme, Eric, Weibull, Jörgen W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Economic theory
Effects
Errors
evolution
Game theory
mistakes
Mutation
mutation rates
Population
Studies
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Summary:J. Bergin and B. Lipman ( Econometrica 64 (1996), 943–956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29–56) and P. Young ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 57–84) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. This is shown to corroborate the results in Kandori–Mailath–Rob (1993) and, under certain regularity conditions, those in Young (1993). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1006/jeth.2001.2941