Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games

We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of operational research 2009-12, Vol.199 (2), p.442-447
Main Authors: Kuipers, J., Flesch, J., Schoenmakers, G., Vrieze, K.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Exact sciences and technology
Game theory
Game theory Stochastic games Perfect information Subgame-perfection
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Perfect information
Stochastic games
Stochastic models
Studies
Subgame-perfection
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Summary:We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
ISSN:0377-2217
1872-6860
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.11.038