Hintikka on Aristotle's Fallacies

[...]they must not be studied by reference to codifications of deductive logic, inductive logic, or informal logic, for these are all usually thought of as codifications of inferences. [n3a] [n3a] [n3a] Instead, the so-called traditional fallacies are best studied by reference to the theory of infor...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 1997-11, Vol.113 (2), p.217-239
Main Authors: Woods, John, Hansen, Hans V.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Argumentation
Aristotelianism
Aristotle
Circular logic
Contradictories
Deductive reasoning
Dialectic
Dialectics
Games
Interrogatives
Logic
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Reasoning
Refutation
Syllogisms
Violations
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Summary:[...]they must not be studied by reference to codifications of deductive logic, inductive logic, or informal logic, for these are all usually thought of as codifications of inferences. [n3a] [n3a] [n3a] Instead, the so-called traditional fallacies are best studied by reference to the theory of information-seeking questioning processes... [...]the fallacy of many questions (better called the fallacy of many propositions) violates the strictures on syllogisms and as such it does not depend on either actual or hypothetical askings, or on the theoretical framework of an interrogative theory.Perhaps it will strike the modern reader as odd that Aristotle should have confined his conception of deduction to the derivation of propositions from propositions. [...]the argument is a failed demonstration.Aristotle in fact records five ways in which a question might be begged (Topics 162b34ff):People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if anyone begs the actual point requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words.; but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms, or a term and an expression that mean the same thing. [...]that reducing to babbling is a bad questioning strategy but not necessarily a logical mistake (Hintikka, 1987, 224), does not tell against the possibility of a logical analysis of the kinds of arguments Aristotle did consider as fallacies.5 We omit discussion of Aristotelian induction (epagoge) since such arguments do not figure either in Hintikkas or our account of Aristotles fallacies.6 Aristotle may admit some variations to this model, e.g., in the kinds of questions permitted238 JOHN WOODS AND HANS V. HANSENand the sorts of answers allowed.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1023/A:1005035327621