A review of radio spectrum combinatorial clock auctions

This paper surveys a decade of Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) to allocate radio spectrum licenses from their inception to 2016. Although all CCAs share a common structure (first an allocation stage and then, an assignment stage), regulators have tailored key variables depending on their spectru...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Telecommunications policy 2017-06, Vol.41 (5-6), p.303-324
Main Authors: Mochon, Asuncion, Saez, Yago
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Activity rules
Auctions
Combinatorial analysis
Combinatorial clock auction (CCA)
Demand analysis
Demand limit
Disclosure
Implementation
Licenses
Packaging
Pricing policies
Pricing rule
Radio
Radio broadcasting
Radio frequency allocation
Regulators
Reserve price
Spectrum allocation
Spectrum auction
Spectrum packaging policy
Studies
Telecommunications policy
Transparency
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Summary:This paper surveys a decade of Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) to allocate radio spectrum licenses from their inception to 2016. Although all CCAs share a common structure (first an allocation stage and then, an assignment stage), regulators have tailored key variables depending on their spectrum policies and market structures. We identify these variables, such as: spectrum packaging policy, reserve price, demand limit, activity rule, transparency and pricing rule. We also analyze the different ways in which regulators can design them along with their implications. This theoretical work is accompanied by a review of the practical implementation decisions in each actual auction and final outcomes. Although all the information is public, it is not easy to find because it is highly disaggregated. Finally, after having identified advantages and disadvantages in this auction model, we present some proposals to improve the actual mechanism. •Survey a decade of Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs).•Identify key variables: spectrum packaging policy, reserve price, demand limit, activity rule, transparency, and pricing rule.•A comparative analysis of the results obtained in all CCAs.•Advantages and disadvantages of this auction model are presented along with possible future improvements.
ISSN:0308-5961
1879-3258
DOI:10.1016/j.telpol.2016.12.003