Measuring the price of anarchy in critical care unit interactions

Hospital throughput is often studied and optimised in isolation, ignoring the interactions between hospitals. In this paper, critical care unit (CCU) interaction is placed within a game theoretic framework. The methodology involves the use of a normal form game underpinned by a two-dimensional conti...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of the Operational Research Society 2017-06, Vol.68 (6), p.630-642
Main Authors: Knight, Vincent, Komenda, Izabela, Griffiths, Jeff
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Business and Management
Critical care
Economic models
Game theory
healthcare
Hospitals
Management
Markov chains
Operations Research/Decision Theory
queueing theory
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Summary:Hospital throughput is often studied and optimised in isolation, ignoring the interactions between hospitals. In this paper, critical care unit (CCU) interaction is placed within a game theoretic framework. The methodology involves the use of a normal form game underpinned by a two-dimensional continuous Markov chain. A theorem is given that proves that a Nash Equilibrium exists in pure strategies for the games considered. In the United Kingdom, a variety of utilisation targets are often discussed: aiming to ensure that wards/hospitals operate at a given utilisation value. The effect of these target policies is investigated justifying their use to align the interests of individual hospitals and social welfare. In particular, we identify the lowest value of a utilisation target that aligns these.
ISSN:0160-5682
1476-9360
DOI:10.1057/s41274-016-0100-8