SCPSE: Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical State Estimation for Power Grid Critical Infrastructures

Preserving the availability and integrity of the power grid critical infrastructures in the face of fast-spreading intrusions requires advances in detection techniques specialized for such large-scale cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we present a security-oriented cyber-physical state estimati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on smart grid 2012-12, Vol.3 (4), p.1790-1799
Main Authors: Zonouz, S., Rogers, K. M., Berthier, R., Bobba, R. B., Sanders, W. H., Overbye, T. J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cyber-physical systems
Hidden Markov models
intrusion detection
maliciously corrupted data detection
Network security
Power grids
Power measurement
security-state estimation
Sensors
State estimation
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Summary:Preserving the availability and integrity of the power grid critical infrastructures in the face of fast-spreading intrusions requires advances in detection techniques specialized for such large-scale cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we present a security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation (SCPSE) system, which, at each time instant, identifies the compromised set of hosts in the cyber network and the maliciously modified set of measurements obtained from power system sensors. SCPSE fuses uncertain information from different types of distributed sensors, such as power system meters and cyber-side intrusion detectors, to detect the malicious activities within the cyber-physical system. We implemented a working prototype of SCPSE and evaluated it using the IEEE 24-bus benchmark system. The experimental results show that SCPSE significantly improves on the scalability of traditional intrusion detection techniques by using information from both cyber and power sensors. Furthermore, SCPSE was able to detect all the attacks against the control network in our experiments.
ISSN:1949-3053
1949-3061
DOI:10.1109/TSG.2012.2217762