Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives

At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American economic journal. Economic policy 2015-11, Vol.7 (4), p.223-242
Main Authors: Kahn, Matthew E., Li, Pei, Zhao, Daxuan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Biochemical oxygen demand
Boundaries
Chemical oxygen demand
Civilization
Economic models
Economic policy
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Environmental economics
Environmental pollution
Federal government
Governors
Incentives
Local government
Politics
Pollutants
Pollution control
Pollution monitoring
Pulp and paper industry
Rivers
Studies
Water pollution
Water quality
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Summary:At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. We document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at province boundaries. Heavy metal pollutants, not targeted by the central government, have not decreased in concentration after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms.
ISSN:1945-7731
1945-774X
DOI:10.1257/pol.20130367