Team Incentives for Education in Developing Countries: A Randomized Field Experiment in Benin

I examine the impact of student incentives in Benin, using three different designs that can be implemented relatively cheaply and with administrative data. The first design is a standard incentive structure where students receive monetary rewards for reaching a performance target. In the other two d...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American economic journal. Applied economics 2014-10, Vol.6 (4), p.90-109
Main Author: Blimpo, Moussa P.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Conferences
Control groups
Cost estimates
Developing countries
Economic theory
Education
Educational incentives
Educational objectives
Educational services
Experiments
Financial incentives
Group incentives
High school students
Incentives
Industrialized nations
International
LDCs
Low income groups
Middle schools
Outcomes of education
Parents & parenting
Rural areas
Schools
Standard deviation
Student retention
Students
Studies
Teams
Test scores
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Summary:I examine the impact of student incentives in Benin, using three different designs that can be implemented relatively cheaply and with administrative data. The first design is a standard incentive structure where students receive monetary rewards for reaching a performance target. In the other two designs, teams of four students receive incentives based on either their performance level as a group or in a team tournament scheme. I find a large and similar average treatment effect across designs, ranging from 0.27 to 0.34 standard deviations (Standard errors do not allow to rule out that the three designs are equally effective).
ISSN:1945-7782
1945-7790
DOI:10.1257/app.6.4.90