Eastbound and down: The United States, NATO enlargement, and suppressing the Soviet and Western European alternatives, 1990-1992

When and why did the United States first contemplate NATO's enlargement into Eastern Europe? Existing research generally portrays U.S. backing for NATO enlargement as a product of the policy debates and particular beliefs inside the William Clinton administration (1993-2001) starting in the mid...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of strategic studies 2020-11, Vol.43 (6-7), p.816-846
Main Author:	Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Alliances Cold War Eastern Europe Enlargement European Union Expansion Foreign policy Historiography International relations Management NATO Realpolitik Russia United States
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	When and why did the United States first contemplate NATO's enlargement into Eastern Europe? Existing research generally portrays U.S. backing for NATO enlargement as a product of the policy debates and particular beliefs inside the William Clinton administration (1993-2001) starting in the mid-1990s. New evidence, however, shows that U.S. backing for enlargement began earlier, under the preceding George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993). Moreover, the Bush administration favored enlargement for fundamentally realpolitik reasons, viewing it as a way of sustaining U.S. preeminence and suppressing challengers in post-Cold War Europe. The results carry implications for historiography, foreign policy, and international relations theory.
ISSN:	0140-2390 1743-937X