Social Optimization Strategy in Unobserved Queueing Systems in Cognitive Radio Networks

We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. "customers" in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. "server"). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing g...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE communications letters 2012-12, Vol.16 (12), p.1944-1947
Main Authors: Do, C. T., Tran, N. H., Mui Van Nguyen, Choong Seon Hong, Sungwon Lee
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Base stations
Cognitive radio
Electric breakdown
Exact sciences and technology
Game theory
M/M/1 queue
Optimization
Pricing
Queueing analysis
Radiocommunication specific techniques
Radiocommunications
Systems, networks and services of telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Teletraffic
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Summary:We study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in the Cognitive Radio (CR) system where selfish Secondary User's (SU) data packets (a.k.a. "customers" in this work) are served by a CR base station (a.k.a. "server"). The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server breakdowns where each customer wants to optimize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner. We first show that the game has an inefficient unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to improve the outcome efficiency, we propose an appropriate admission fee that can be easily implemented at the server. We then show that the social welfare at the equilibrium point can be coincided the social welfare of the socially optimal strategy.
ISSN:1089-7798
1558-2558
DOI:10.1109/LCOMM.2012.111412.120830