Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development

► The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation, which relies itself of the establishment of equal and extended rights to citizens. ► The establishment of the rule of law relies in particular...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Comparative Economics 2010-09, Vol.38 (3), p.253-266
Main Authors: Brousseau, Eric, Schemeil, Yves, Sgard, Jérôme
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bureaucracy
Constitution
Delegation of authority
Development economics
Development theory
Economic development
Economics and Finance
Federalism
Humanities and Social Sciences
Institutionalism
Institutions and development
Institutions and development Rule of law Public bureaucracy State Constitution Federalism Rulers vs. governed Legal bargaining Delegation of authority
Law
Legal bargaining
Political science
Public bureaucracy
Rule of law
Rulers vs. governed
State
State theory
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Summary:► The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation, which relies itself of the establishment of equal and extended rights to citizens. ► The establishment of the rule of law relies in particular on a movement of integration and hierarchization of, legal norms and courts. ► The development of a capable and impartial public bureaucracy is a prerequisite to implementing rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. ► Rights are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, who claim for more firmly established and more extended rights in a vertical bargain with the rulers. ► The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, resulting in a progressive equalization of rights. Second, development of a capable and impartial state is a prerequisite to implementation of rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. The mutual expansion of these dynamics relies on a vertical negotiation between the elite and the governed. The governed call for rights that are more firmly established and more extended. The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. This model allows discussing the sustainability of various paths of institutional change in processes of development by identifying the potential virtuous dynamics and hindering factors.
ISSN:0147-5967
1095-7227
DOI:10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.004