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Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises: Fiscal Consolidation, Bail-Ins, or Bail-Outs?
The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors’bail-ins entail international spillovers. We use the model to solve for the optimal combination between...
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Published in: | IMF economic review 2018-12, Vol.66 (4), p.665-693 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors’bail-ins entail international spillovers. We use the model to solve for the optimal combination between fiscal consolidation, bail-ins, and bail-outs to restore debt sustainability. For non-systemic countries, only fiscal consolidation and bail-ins should be used, based on an ex-post assessment of their relative costs. Systemic crises raise significant new challenges. First, to reduce the spillovers associated with bail-ins, IFIs should be able to provide bail-outs. Second, to contain the moral hazard effects of bail-outs, IFIs should operate under a binding crisis-resolution framework that limits the provision of bail-outs to highly systemic countries, coupled with more stringent fiscal consolidation requirements. |
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ISSN: | 2041-4161 2041-417X |
DOI: | 10.1057/s41308-018-0067-3 |