Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations

In 1995, the Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the Training and Doctrine Command began a joint venture called Force XXI, the focus of which was to understand how information-age technology could improve the U.S. Army's warfighting capabilities. The Task Force XXI (TFXXI) and Division...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Metz, Thomas F, Garrett, Mark W, Hutton, James E, Bush, Timothy W
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
AL-FAJR OPERATION
ARMY
CASE STUDIES
CNO(COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS)
COMPUTER NETWORKS
COUNTERINSURGENCY
DECEPTION
DIPLOMACY
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
FALLUJAH(IRAQ)
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Information Science
INFORMATION WARFARE
IRAQI WAR
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
LEADERSHIP
MASS MEDIA
MEDIAL COVERAGE
MILITARY COMMANDERS
MNC-I(MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ)
MNF-I(MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ)
OPSEC(OPERATIONAL SECURITY)
PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
PUBLIC OPINION
PUBLIC RELATIONS
REPRINTS
Unconventional Warfare
VIGILANT RESOLVE OPERATION
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Summary:In 1995, the Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the Training and Doctrine Command began a joint venture called Force XXI, the focus of which was to understand how information-age technology could improve the U.S. Army's warfighting capabilities. The Task Force XXI (TFXXI) and Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) were the capstone events of this venture. Over 70 initiatives were reviewed in the TFXXI AWE, which culminated at Fort Irwin, California, in March 1997 with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division's National Training Center rotation. At the heart of this experiment was near real-time location knowledge of friendly units down to individual vehicles and in some cases, individual Soldiers. The experiment proved that Where I am and where my buddies are is powerful information for combat leaders. Leaders at all echelons became convinced that information-age technology would help our Soldiers, leaders, and formations become much more capable. There are five disciplines which make up the Army's doctrinal IO: psychological operations (PSYOP), deception, operational security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). The author relates how these five disciplines were used in Operation Al-Fajr in Iraq, when he was commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I, MNC-I and MNF-W were successful in massing effects in the information domain in Operation Al-Fajr for three reasons: they articulated an achievable end-state; they took pains to integrate, synchronize, and execute with discipline all of the elements of combat power (leadership, movement and maneuver, intelligence) and all of the tools available in the information domain (traditional IO, PA, engagement, and political actions); and they were able to effectively bridge the firewall between IO and PA to achieve their desired end-state without violating the rules of either discipline. Published in Military Review, p2-12, May-Jun 2006.