Millar v Taylor as a precedent for statutory interpretation

Millar v Taylor is an iconic case for statutory interpretation. It has long been regarded as the case in which the rule prohibiting reliance on legislative history was first put forward by Mr. Justice Willes in 1769. However, a close reading of the judgment reveals an uncomfortable fit between the r...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Common law world review 2018-09, Vol.47 (3), p.217-221
Main Author: Magyar, John J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
History
Interpretation and construction
Law
Law and legislation
Stare decisis
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Millar v Taylor is an iconic case for statutory interpretation. It has long been regarded as the case in which the rule prohibiting reliance on legislative history was first put forward by Mr. Justice Willes in 1769. However, a close reading of the judgment reveals an uncomfortable fit between the rule that the case purports to stand for and the judicial reasoning within it. Meanwhile, the case was cited frequently throughout the 19th century, but never in support of the exclusionary rule. During that time period, the judiciary was aware of the fact that Mr. Justice Willes’ famous statement was contradicted by reasoning in the case. It was in the 20th century that scholars began citing Millar v Taylor in support of the exclusionary rule—a time when the quantity of published cases and secondary literature had increased significantly, and cases like Millar v Taylor were being cited without necessarily being read. This stands as a cautionary tale: one ought to quote with care, particularly when citing older cases.
ISSN:1473-7795
1740-5556
DOI:10.1177/1473779518793843