Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA)...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE journal on selected areas in communications 2013-11, Vol.31 (11), p.2566-2579
Main Authors: Tran, Nguyen H., Choong Seon Hong, Zhu Han, Sungwon Lee
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognitive radio networks
Delays
dynamic spectrum access
Games
Monopoly
Nash equilibrium
network pricing
Pricing
Queueing analysis
Stackelberg game
Xenon
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Summary:This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iteraIntive algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.
ISSN:0733-8716
1558-0008
DOI:10.1109/JSAC.2013.131134