Espionage and the 1935 Press War in Palestine: Revisiting Factionalism, Forgeries and Fake News
Abstract In 1935, Palestinian newspapers published a forged letter alleged to have been sent from pan-Islamist leader, Shakib Arslan, to the Palestinian leader and Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni. The letter indicated that Husayni and Arslan accepted Italian bribes in exchange for pro-Italian ar...
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| Published in: | The English historical review 2023-12, Vol.138 (592), p.528-565 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | eng |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Abstract
In 1935, Palestinian newspapers published a forged letter alleged to have been sent from pan-Islamist leader, Shakib Arslan, to the Palestinian leader and Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni. The letter indicated that Husayni and Arslan accepted Italian bribes in exchange for pro-Italian articles in the publications they controlled. Italy was widely despised for its treatment of Libyan Muslims, and so exposing this relationship was expected to be controversial. Amid a national debate about Italy’s imminent invasion of Abyssinia, and its role in the Eastern Mediterranean, Husayni’s Palestinian opponents hoped to embarrass him as a sell-out. Both a government official and national leader, Husayni’s true position came to define the Palestinian debate about the national interest: should Palestinians co-operate with one oppressive empire so as to free themselves from another? Relying on multilingual and multinational archival evidence, this article proves that the letter was indeed forged, but based on real intelligence gathered by Husayni’s Palestinian opponents who sought to damage his reputation. It also shows that British intelligence probably encouraged the forgery, hoping to expose and stem Italian propaganda activity. The scheme backfired and accelerated Italian interference in Palestine. It crystalised Husayni’s popularity, as Palestinians believed he could deliver national liberation. They did not care if Italy was involved. This episode shows that British assessments of ‘factional’ Palestinian politics reflected their shallow understanding of these conflicts. Meanwhile, it also sheds unique light on Palestinian espionage and counterintelligence work, and the way in which it empowered Husayni and Arslan. |
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| ISSN: | 0013-8266 1477-4534 |