Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols

Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently, Nam et al. showed that a provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing by Wen et al. i...

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Main Authors:	Raphael C.-W. Phan, Wei-Chuen Yau, Bok-Min Goi
Format:	Default Conference proceeding
Published:	2009
Subjects:	Mechanical engineering not elsewhere classified Password-authenticated key exchange Weil pairing Attacks Cryptanalysis Key compromise impersonation Provable security Three-party Mechanical Engineering not elsewhere classified
Online Access:	https://hdl.handle.net/2134/5683
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id	rr-article-9554048
record_format	Figshare
spelling	rr-article-95540482009-01-01T00:00:00Z Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols Raphael C.-W. Phan (7168670) Wei-Chuen Yau (7209167) Bok-Min Goi (7209122) Mechanical engineering not elsewhere classified Password-authenticated key exchange Weil pairing Attacks Cryptanalysis Key compromise impersonation Provable security Three-party Mechanical Engineering not elsewhere classified Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently, Nam et al. showed that a provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing by Wen et al. is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In doing so, Nam et al. showed the flaws in the proof of Wen et al. and described how to fix the problem so that their attack no longer works. In this paper, we show that both Wen et al. and Nam et al. variants fall to key compromise impersonation by any adversary. Our results underline the fact that although the provable security approach is necessary to designing PAKEs, gaps still exist between what can be proven and what are really secure in practice. 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z Text Conference contribution 2134/5683 https://figshare.com/articles/conference_contribution/Analysis_of_two_pairing-based_three-party_password_authenticated_key_exchange_protocols/9554048 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
institution	Loughborough University
collection	Figshare
topic	Mechanical engineering not elsewhere classified Password-authenticated key exchange Weil pairing Attacks Cryptanalysis Key compromise impersonation Provable security Three-party Mechanical Engineering not elsewhere classified
spellingShingle	Mechanical engineering not elsewhere classified Password-authenticated key exchange Weil pairing Attacks Cryptanalysis Key compromise impersonation Provable security Three-party Mechanical Engineering not elsewhere classified Raphael C.-W. Phan Wei-Chuen Yau Bok-Min Goi Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
description	Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently, Nam et al. showed that a provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing by Wen et al. is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In doing so, Nam et al. showed the flaws in the proof of Wen et al. and described how to fix the problem so that their attack no longer works. In this paper, we show that both Wen et al. and Nam et al. variants fall to key compromise impersonation by any adversary. Our results underline the fact that although the provable security approach is necessary to designing PAKEs, gaps still exist between what can be proven and what are really secure in practice.
format	Default Conference proceeding
author	Raphael C.-W. Phan Wei-Chuen Yau Bok-Min Goi
author_facet	Raphael C.-W. Phan Wei-Chuen Yau Bok-Min Goi
author_sort	Raphael C.-W. Phan (7168670)
title	Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
title_short	Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
title_full	Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
title_fullStr	Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
title_full_unstemmed	Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
title_sort	analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols
publishDate	2009
url	https://hdl.handle.net/2134/5683
_version_	1797920609152270336

Analysis of two pairing-based three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols

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