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The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks

Banks normally trade-off the amount of loans created by the amount of risk piled up in their assets portfolios. However, their performance can induce a ‘search for yield’ or ‘gamble to survive’ behaviour. Using a sample of 149 European banks during the period 2001-2016, we show that the risk managem...

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Main Authors: Thaer Alhalabi, Vitor Castro, Justine Wood
Format: Default Article
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2134/13475061.v1
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author Thaer Alhalabi
Vitor Castro
Justine Wood
author_facet Thaer Alhalabi
Vitor Castro
Justine Wood
author_sort Thaer Alhalabi (4862359)
collection Figshare
description Banks normally trade-off the amount of loans created by the amount of risk piled up in their assets portfolios. However, their performance can induce a ‘search for yield’ or ‘gamble to survive’ behaviour. Using a sample of 149 European banks during the period 2001-2016, we show that the risk management hypothesis holds for the period after the 2007-08 financial crisis and for large banks. Contrarily, the moral hazard hypothesis, under which banks practise excessive lending to relatively risky borrowers that pay higher premium but increase their credit risk, is supported in the pre-crisis period and for small banks. Additionally, we provide important implications to suggest that the post-crisis regulations have restrained banks with poor performance from the ‘gamble to survive’ behaviour.
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institution Loughborough University
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spelling rr-article-134750612021-01-10T00:00:00Z The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks Thaer Alhalabi (4862359) Vitor Castro (3375743) Justine Wood (1255122) Bank lending Loan pricing Bank performance Bank risk Financial crisis Banks normally trade-off the amount of loans created by the amount of risk piled up in their assets portfolios. However, their performance can induce a ‘search for yield’ or ‘gamble to survive’ behaviour. Using a sample of 149 European banks during the period 2001-2016, we show that the risk management hypothesis holds for the period after the 2007-08 financial crisis and for large banks. Contrarily, the moral hazard hypothesis, under which banks practise excessive lending to relatively risky borrowers that pay higher premium but increase their credit risk, is supported in the pre-crisis period and for small banks. Additionally, we provide important implications to suggest that the post-crisis regulations have restrained banks with poor performance from the ‘gamble to survive’ behaviour. 2021-01-10T00:00:00Z Text Journal contribution 2134/13475061.v1 https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/The_relationship_between_excessive_lending_risk_premium_and_risk-taking_evidence_from_European_banks/13475061 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
spellingShingle Bank lending
Loan pricing
Bank performance
Bank risk
Financial crisis
Thaer Alhalabi
Vitor Castro
Justine Wood
The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title_full The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title_fullStr The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title_full_unstemmed The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title_short The relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from European banks
title_sort relationship between excessive lending, risk premium and risk-taking: evidence from european banks
topic Bank lending
Loan pricing
Bank performance
Bank risk
Financial crisis
url https://hdl.handle.net/2134/13475061.v1