Targeting FDI

We study the tax/subsidy competition between two countries to attract the FDI projects of two firms. We assume that governments lack the capacity to target every potential inward investor such that each can only bid for a single firm. When the characteristics of the two countries are common knowledg...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ben Ferrett, Ian Wooton
Format:	Default Article
Published:	2020
Subjects:	foreign direct investment tax/subsidy competition efficiency
Online Access:	https://hdl.handle.net/2134/12866270.v1
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

id	rr-article-12866270
record_format	Figshare
spelling	rr-article-128662702020-09-19T00:00:00Z Targeting FDI Ben Ferrett (1250850) Ian Wooton (7195058) foreign direct investment tax/subsidy competition efficiency We study the tax/subsidy competition between two countries to attract the FDI projects of two firms. We assume that governments lack the capacity to target every potential inward investor such that each can only bid for a single firm. When the characteristics of the two countries are common knowledge, subsidy competition never arises in equilibrium. Both governments may target the same firm if there is uncertainty as to the more profitable location for that firm’s plant, such that both governments believe they may win the competition. We also explore how such uncertainty affects the firms’ after-tax profits. 2020-09-19T00:00:00Z Text Journal contribution 2134/12866270.v1 https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Targeting_FDI/12866270 CC BY 4.0
institution	Loughborough University
collection	Figshare
topic	foreign direct investment tax/subsidy competition efficiency
spellingShingle	foreign direct investment tax/subsidy competition efficiency Ben Ferrett Ian Wooton Targeting FDI
description	We study the tax/subsidy competition between two countries to attract the FDI projects of two firms. We assume that governments lack the capacity to target every potential inward investor such that each can only bid for a single firm. When the characteristics of the two countries are common knowledge, subsidy competition never arises in equilibrium. Both governments may target the same firm if there is uncertainty as to the more profitable location for that firm’s plant, such that both governments believe they may win the competition. We also explore how such uncertainty affects the firms’ after-tax profits.
format	Default Article
author	Ben Ferrett Ian Wooton
author_facet	Ben Ferrett Ian Wooton
author_sort	Ben Ferrett (1250850)
title	Targeting FDI
title_short	Targeting FDI
title_full	Targeting FDI
title_fullStr	Targeting FDI
title_full_unstemmed	Targeting FDI
title_sort	targeting fdi
publishDate	2020
url	https://hdl.handle.net/2134/12866270.v1
_version_	1797368255844712448

Targeting FDI

Similar Items