Weak keys in the McEliece public-key cryptosystem

We show that it is possible to know whether the secret Goppa code of an instance of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem was chosen with a binary generator polynomial. Furthermore, whenever such a weak key is used, we present an attack which can be completed, for codes of length 1024 and dimension 5...

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Published in:IEEE transactions on information theory 2001-03, Vol.47 (3), p.1207-1211
Main Authors: Loidreau, P., Sendrier, N.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Computation
Cryptography
Generators
Goppa codes
Information theory
Keys
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description We show that it is possible to know whether the secret Goppa code of an instance of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem was chosen with a binary generator polynomial. Furthermore, whenever such a weak key is used, we present an attack which can be completed, for codes of length 1024 and dimension 524, with a large, but feasible amount of computation.
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subjects Algorithms
Computation
Cryptography
Generators
Goppa codes
Information theory
Keys
title Weak keys in the McEliece public-key cryptosystem
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