Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability

We consider strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. We provide several characterization results in the case...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Econometrica 1999-05, Vol.67 (3), p.605-628
Main Authors: Breton, Michel Le, Sen, Arunava
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applications
Biology, psychology, social sciences
Decision theory
decomposable
Dictators
Dictatorship
Econometrics
Efficient strategies
Exact sciences and technology
Insurance, economics, finance
Interest
Lexicography
Libertarianism
Logical theorems
Mathematical functions
Mathematics
Preferences
Probability and statistics
Product choice
product domains
Property partitioning
Public choice
Public good
Public goods
Sciences and techniques of general use
separable preferences
Social choice
Social impact
Statistics
Strategyproof
Studies
Voting
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Summary:We consider strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. We provide several characterization results in the case where preferences are separable only with respect to the elements of some partition of the set of components and these partitions vary across individuals. We characterize the libertarian social choice function and show that no superset of the tops separable domain admits strategyproof nondictatorial social choice functions.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.1111/1468-0262.00038