Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control

This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets wit...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of financial economics 2008-03, Vol.87 (3), p.656-677
Main Authors:	Bates, Thomas W., Becher, David A., Lemmon, Michael L.
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Acquisition Anti takeover strategy Antitakeover provisions Bids Board of directors Boards Boards of directors Business management Business valuation Classification Classified board Corporate governance Directors Market Merger Mergers Procurement Staggered board Studies Take-overs Takeovers Tender offers
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Description
Summary:	This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets with a classified board realize bid returns that are equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors, but receive a higher proportion of total bid surplus. Board classification does reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, however, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that board classification is an anti-takeover device that facilitates managerial entrenchment.
ISSN:	0304-405X 1879-2774