Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	British journal of political science 2019-10, Vol.49 (4), p.1251-1277
Main Authors:	Hollyer, James R., Rosendorff, B. Peter, Vreeland, James Raymond
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Attitudes Citizens Democracy Demonstrations & protests Elections Incumbency Leadership Legitimacy Negative campaigning Political institutions Political leadership Political science Political systems Satisfaction Transparency Voter behavior Voters
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.
ISSN:	0007-1234 1469-2112