Temporary Constitutional Amendments as a Means to Undermine the Democratic Order: Insights from the Israeli Experience

This article focuses on the adoption of temporary measures within the generally rigid constitutional sphere. Commentators frequently contemplate the extent to which temporary constitutional measures are adequate and necessary within a constitution that is meant to be perpetuated. Some writers are in...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Israel law review 2018-11, Vol.51 (3), p.389-425
Main Author:	Dishon, Nadav
Format:	Article
Language:	eng
Subjects:	Accountability Amendments Authoritarianism Constitutional amendments Constitutional law Constitutionalism Constitutions Democracy Employment Flexibility Imperialism Judges & magistrates Judicial reviews Legislation Legitimacy Politics Power Public opinion State laws Temporary employment
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Description
Summary:	This article focuses on the adoption of temporary measures within the generally rigid constitutional sphere. Commentators frequently contemplate the extent to which temporary constitutional measures are adequate and necessary within a constitution that is meant to be perpetuated. Some writers are in favour of temporary constitutionalism, claiming that it allows flexibility and relieves the counter-majoritarian problem. Others emphasise the devastating impact of intense implementation of temporary measures on the status and legitimacy of the constitution. The article contends that as beneficial as temporary constitutionalism may be in some circumstances, its use should be scrutinised with great suspicion, especially when it is employed in weak constitutional regimes. In outlining the history of temporary constitutionalism in the State of Israel, the article illustrates how temporary constitutional amendments can be harnessed to undermine the democratic order. The Israeli use of temporary constitutionalism since 2009 reveals a new under-explored manifestation of ‘abusive constitutionalism’, referred to here as ‘abusive temporary constitutionalism’. With abusive temporary constitutionalism, incumbents can entrench their power against their opponents while avoiding both public accountability and judicial review of their actions. Drawing on the Israeli experience, the article outlines several signifiers (i.e. distinctive markers) which will allow judges in the future to monitor and suppress the development of the abusive employment of temporary constitutional amendments.
ISSN:	0021-2237 2047-9336