Accountability and Information in Elections

Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between thes...

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Published in:American economic journal. Microeconomics 2017-05, Vol.9 (2), p.95-138
Main Authors: Ashworth, Scott, de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, Friedenberg, Amanda
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Cost functions
Economic models
Governance
Incumbents
Microeconomics
Political elections
Politicians
Production functions
Public goods
Voter behavior
Voters
Voting
Voting behavior
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container_title American economic journal. Microeconomics
container_volume 9
creator Ashworth, Scott
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Friedenberg, Amanda
description Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters' ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter welfare. This is because increasing effective accountability directly impacts how informative governance outcomes are about an incumbent's type. We show that, if politicians' effort and type are local substitutes (resp. complements) in the production of governance outcomes, an increase in effective accountability corresponds to a decrease (resp. increase) in Blackwell (1951) informativeness. We also show that effective accountability can vary even absent institutional variation. In particular, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be multiple equilibria that differ in terms of both effective accountability and electoral selection. Overall, our findings have implications for voter behavior, the efficacy of institutional reforms, and voter welfare.
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subjects Accountability
Cost functions
Economic models
Governance
Incumbents
Microeconomics
Political elections
Politicians
Production functions
Public goods
Voter behavior
Voters
Voting
Voting behavior
title Accountability and Information in Elections
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