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Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?
It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President's nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to...
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| Published in: | The Yale law journal 2013-01, Vol.122 (4), p.940-979 |
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| Language: | English |
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| container_end_page | 979 |
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| container_title | The Yale law journal |
| container_volume | 122 |
| creator | STEPHENSON, MATTHEW C. |
| description | It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President's nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action on presidential nominations. |
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This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action on presidential nominations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0044-0094</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-8611</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New Haven: The Yale Law Journal Company</publisher><subject>Advice and consent ; Consent ; Constitutions ; ESSAY ; Executive branch ; Executive power ; Hearings & confirmations ; Implied consent ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Legal consent ; Legal objections ; Legislatures ; Nominations ; Political appointments ; Presidential elections ; Presidents ; Recess appointments ; Senators ; Studies ; Treaties ; United States Senate ; Upper houses ; Voting</subject><ispartof>The Yale law journal, 2013-01, Vol.122 (4), p.940-979</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2013 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2013 Yale University, School of Law</rights><rights>Copyright Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. 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This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action on presidential nominations.</description><subject>Advice and consent</subject><subject>Consent</subject><subject>Constitutions</subject><subject>ESSAY</subject><subject>Executive branch</subject><subject>Executive power</subject><subject>Hearings & confirmations</subject><subject>Implied consent</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Legal consent</subject><subject>Legal objections</subject><subject>Legislatures</subject><subject>Nominations</subject><subject>Political appointments</subject><subject>Presidential elections</subject><subject>Presidents</subject><subject>Recess appointments</subject><subject>Senators</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Treaties</subject><subject>United States Senate</subject><subject>Upper houses</subject><subject>Voting</subject><issn>0044-0094</issn><issn>1939-8611</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNptzl1LwzAUBuAiCs7pTxACXglWkjbNkisZw4_BYAN1gjclpqddRpfUJJX57w1M0MFyIAdynjfJUTIgIhcpZ4QcJwOMKU0xFvQ0OfN-jeOiQgyS94k0KKwALRx4XYEJaNx1Vse-cNoo3ckW3W9B9UF_AZrXtVbgPHrTYWX7gCR6BiMDoIk1tXYbGbQ1aGkD3J0nJ7VsPVz89mHy-nD_MnlKZ_PH6WQ8SxtKaEhzIqisQFGMCWdFwQkRgtSMq6KWWVFRiTmXDBdxRAVlhcKMVUAyLjgwzvNhcrW7t3P2swcfyrXtnYlPlmSUsZEglGV_qpEtlNrUNjipNtqrchy_kGWcYxpVekA1YMDJ1hqodTze87cHfKwKNlodDFzvBaIJsA2N7L0vp_Plvr35Zz96rw34uHndrILfRfb45Y6vfbCu7JzeSPddZnmRccZw_gPpMZ9H</recordid><startdate>20130101</startdate><enddate>20130101</enddate><creator>STEPHENSON, MATTHEW C.</creator><general>The Yale Law Journal Company</general><general>Yale University, School of Law</general><general>Yale Law Journal Company, Inc</general><scope>IOV</scope><scope>ILT</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130101</creationdate><title>Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?</title><author>STEPHENSON, MATTHEW C.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g414t-3194adec40018655811991f68c5fa25d4a088a60555849465c066de12898e6883</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Advice and consent</topic><topic>Consent</topic><topic>Constitutions</topic><topic>ESSAY</topic><topic>Executive branch</topic><topic>Executive power</topic><topic>Hearings & confirmations</topic><topic>Implied consent</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Legal consent</topic><topic>Legal objections</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Nominations</topic><topic>Political appointments</topic><topic>Presidential elections</topic><topic>Presidents</topic><topic>Recess appointments</topic><topic>Senators</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Treaties</topic><topic>United States Senate</topic><topic>Upper houses</topic><topic>Voting</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>STEPHENSON, MATTHEW C.</creatorcontrib><collection>Gale In Context: Opposing Viewpoints</collection><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Yale law journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>STEPHENSON, MATTHEW C.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?</atitle><jtitle>The Yale law journal</jtitle><date>2013-01-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>122</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>940</spage><epage>979</epage><pages>940-979</pages><issn>0044-0094</issn><eissn>1939-8611</eissn><abstract>It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President's nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0044-0094 |
| ispartof | The Yale law journal, 2013-01, Vol.122 (4), p.940-979 |
| issn | 0044-0094 1939-8611 |
| language | eng |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Nexis UK; EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection |
| subjects | Advice and consent Consent Constitutions ESSAY Executive branch Executive power Hearings & confirmations Implied consent Laws, regulations and rules Legal consent Legal objections Legislatures Nominations Political appointments Presidential elections Presidents Recess appointments Senators Studies Treaties United States Senate Upper houses Voting |
| title | Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote? |
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