Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols

Although postquantum cryptography is of growing practical concern, not many works have been devoted to implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols....

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on computers 2018-11, Vol.67 (11), p.1535-1549
Main Authors: Espitau, Thomas, Fouque, Pierre-Alain, Gerard, Benoit, Tibouchi, Mehdi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cryptography
Digital signatures
Exchanging
Fault attacks
Hardware
Lattices
postquantum cryptography
Private networks
Protocols
Signatures
Software
Storage area networks
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites
container_end_page 1549
container_issue 11
container_start_page 1535
container_title IEEE transactions on computers
container_volume 67
creator Espitau, Thomas
Fouque, Pierre-Alain
Gerard, Benoit
Tibouchi, Mehdi
description Although postquantum cryptography is of growing practical concern, not many works have been devoted to implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols. For signature schemes, we are interested both in Fiat-Shamir type constructions (particularly BLISS, but also GLP, PASSSign, and Ring-TESLA) and in hash-and-sign schemes (particularly the GPV-based scheme of Ducas-Prest-Lyubashevsky). For key exchange protocols, we study the implementations of NewHope, Frodo, and Kyber. These schemes form a representative sample of modern, practical lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols, and achieve a high level of efficiency in both software and hardware. We present several fault attacks against those schemes that recover the entire key recovery with only a few faulty executions (sometimes only one), show that those attacks can be mounted in practice based on concrete experiments in hardware, and discuss possible countermeasures against them.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/TC.2018.2833119
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_ieee_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_8354897</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>8354897</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>2117182736</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-3cd1ec40e252e41a315d59401d6b2462f687646122a2c6aea5198f18698a9adc3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotjcFOAjEURRujiYiuXbhp4rrY10477RIJqHESTMD1pHQeMASm2HYS-XtJcHUW9-QeQh6BjwC4fVlORoKDGQkjJYC9IgNQqmTWKn1NBvw8MSsLfkvuUtpxzrXgdkDmVQhHNl6FmOnM9fucaOho5XJuPbJXl7Chi3bTudxHpAu_xQMm6rqGfuKJTn_91nUbpF8x5ODDPt2Tm7XbJ3z455B8z6bLyTur5m8fk3HFWsFlZtI3gL7gKJTAApwE1ShbcGj0ShRarLUpdaFBCCe8dugUWLMGo61x1jVeDsnz5fcYw0-PKde70MfunKwFQAlGlFKfraeL1SJifYztwcVTbaQqjC3lHxFLV-M</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2117182736</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols</title><source>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Journals</source><creator>Espitau, Thomas ; Fouque, Pierre-Alain ; Gerard, Benoit ; Tibouchi, Mehdi</creator><creatorcontrib>Espitau, Thomas ; Fouque, Pierre-Alain ; Gerard, Benoit ; Tibouchi, Mehdi</creatorcontrib><description>Although postquantum cryptography is of growing practical concern, not many works have been devoted to implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols. For signature schemes, we are interested both in Fiat-Shamir type constructions (particularly BLISS, but also GLP, PASSSign, and Ring-TESLA) and in hash-and-sign schemes (particularly the GPV-based scheme of Ducas-Prest-Lyubashevsky). For key exchange protocols, we study the implementations of NewHope, Frodo, and Kyber. These schemes form a representative sample of modern, practical lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols, and achieve a high level of efficiency in both software and hardware. We present several fault attacks against those schemes that recover the entire key recovery with only a few faulty executions (sometimes only one), show that those attacks can be mounted in practice based on concrete experiments in hardware, and discuss possible countermeasures against them.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0018-9340</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1557-9956</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/TC.2018.2833119</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ITCOB4</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Cryptography ; Digital signatures ; Exchanging ; Fault attacks ; Hardware ; Lattices ; postquantum cryptography ; Private networks ; Protocols ; Signatures ; Software ; Storage area networks</subject><ispartof>IEEE transactions on computers, 2018-11, Vol.67 (11), p.1535-1549</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><orcidid>0000-0002-7655-9594 ; 0000-0002-0598-2387 ; 0000-0002-2736-2963</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8354897$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,786,790,27957,27958,55147</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Espitau, Thomas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fouque, Pierre-Alain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gerard, Benoit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tibouchi, Mehdi</creatorcontrib><title>Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols</title><title>IEEE transactions on computers</title><addtitle>TC</addtitle><description>Although postquantum cryptography is of growing practical concern, not many works have been devoted to implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols. For signature schemes, we are interested both in Fiat-Shamir type constructions (particularly BLISS, but also GLP, PASSSign, and Ring-TESLA) and in hash-and-sign schemes (particularly the GPV-based scheme of Ducas-Prest-Lyubashevsky). For key exchange protocols, we study the implementations of NewHope, Frodo, and Kyber. These schemes form a representative sample of modern, practical lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols, and achieve a high level of efficiency in both software and hardware. We present several fault attacks against those schemes that recover the entire key recovery with only a few faulty executions (sometimes only one), show that those attacks can be mounted in practice based on concrete experiments in hardware, and discuss possible countermeasures against them.</description><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Digital signatures</subject><subject>Exchanging</subject><subject>Fault attacks</subject><subject>Hardware</subject><subject>Lattices</subject><subject>postquantum cryptography</subject><subject>Private networks</subject><subject>Protocols</subject><subject>Signatures</subject><subject>Software</subject><subject>Storage area networks</subject><issn>0018-9340</issn><issn>1557-9956</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNotjcFOAjEURRujiYiuXbhp4rrY10477RIJqHESTMD1pHQeMASm2HYS-XtJcHUW9-QeQh6BjwC4fVlORoKDGQkjJYC9IgNQqmTWKn1NBvw8MSsLfkvuUtpxzrXgdkDmVQhHNl6FmOnM9fucaOho5XJuPbJXl7Chi3bTudxHpAu_xQMm6rqGfuKJTn_91nUbpF8x5ODDPt2Tm7XbJ3z455B8z6bLyTur5m8fk3HFWsFlZtI3gL7gKJTAApwE1ShbcGj0ShRarLUpdaFBCCe8dugUWLMGo61x1jVeDsnz5fcYw0-PKde70MfunKwFQAlGlFKfraeL1SJifYztwcVTbaQqjC3lHxFLV-M</recordid><startdate>20181101</startdate><enddate>20181101</enddate><creator>Espitau, Thomas</creator><creator>Fouque, Pierre-Alain</creator><creator>Gerard, Benoit</creator><creator>Tibouchi, Mehdi</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7655-9594</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0598-2387</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2736-2963</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20181101</creationdate><title>Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols</title><author>Espitau, Thomas ; Fouque, Pierre-Alain ; Gerard, Benoit ; Tibouchi, Mehdi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-3cd1ec40e252e41a315d59401d6b2462f687646122a2c6aea5198f18698a9adc3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Digital signatures</topic><topic>Exchanging</topic><topic>Fault attacks</topic><topic>Hardware</topic><topic>Lattices</topic><topic>postquantum cryptography</topic><topic>Private networks</topic><topic>Protocols</topic><topic>Signatures</topic><topic>Software</topic><topic>Storage area networks</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Espitau, Thomas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fouque, Pierre-Alain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gerard, Benoit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tibouchi, Mehdi</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Electronics &amp; Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts – Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><jtitle>IEEE transactions on computers</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Espitau, Thomas</au><au>Fouque, Pierre-Alain</au><au>Gerard, Benoit</au><au>Tibouchi, Mehdi</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols</atitle><jtitle>IEEE transactions on computers</jtitle><stitle>TC</stitle><date>2018-11-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>67</volume><issue>11</issue><spage>1535</spage><epage>1549</epage><pages>1535-1549</pages><issn>0018-9340</issn><eissn>1557-9956</eissn><coden>ITCOB4</coden><abstract>Although postquantum cryptography is of growing practical concern, not many works have been devoted to implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes. In this paper, we look in particular at fault attacks against implementations of lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols. For signature schemes, we are interested both in Fiat-Shamir type constructions (particularly BLISS, but also GLP, PASSSign, and Ring-TESLA) and in hash-and-sign schemes (particularly the GPV-based scheme of Ducas-Prest-Lyubashevsky). For key exchange protocols, we study the implementations of NewHope, Frodo, and Kyber. These schemes form a representative sample of modern, practical lattice-based signatures and key exchange protocols, and achieve a high level of efficiency in both software and hardware. We present several fault attacks against those schemes that recover the entire key recovery with only a few faulty executions (sometimes only one), show that those attacks can be mounted in practice based on concrete experiments in hardware, and discuss possible countermeasures against them.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/TC.2018.2833119</doi><tpages>15</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7655-9594</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0598-2387</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2736-2963</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0018-9340
ispartof IEEE transactions on computers, 2018-11, Vol.67 (11), p.1535-1549
issn 0018-9340
1557-9956
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_8354897
source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Journals
subjects Cryptography
Digital signatures
Exchanging
Fault attacks
Hardware
Lattices
postquantum cryptography
Private networks
Protocols
Signatures
Software
Storage area networks
title Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and Key Exchange Protocols
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-09-23T00%3A25%3A13IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_ieee_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Loop-Abort%20Faults%20on%20Lattice-Based%20Signature%20Schemes%20and%20Key%20Exchange%20Protocols&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20transactions%20on%20computers&rft.au=Espitau,%20Thomas&rft.date=2018-11-01&rft.volume=67&rft.issue=11&rft.spage=1535&rft.epage=1549&rft.pages=1535-1549&rft.issn=0018-9340&rft.eissn=1557-9956&rft.coden=ITCOB4&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/TC.2018.2833119&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_ieee_%3E2117182736%3C/proquest_ieee_%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-3cd1ec40e252e41a315d59401d6b2462f687646122a2c6aea5198f18698a9adc3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2117182736&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=8354897&rfr_iscdi=true